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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. : 
CHARLOTTE MARLENE LONGSHAW, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No.960746-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT LONGSHAW 
ARGUMENT 
This brief addresses only those issues presented in appellee's 
response brief that are not addressed in appellant's original 
brief. For all issues not addressed here appellant relies on the 
original brief. 
I. The Misstatements Made by the Prosecution 
During Closing Arguments Were of Grave 
Prejudice to Marlene Longshaw. 
While the State recognizes that Mr. Christensen's argument to 
the Jury in this matter contained a clear misstatement of law, they 
desire this Court to believe that the reading of a terribly 
confusing jury instruction, followed by proclaiming to the Jury 
that the instruction shows he was correct in his previous 
statement, all accompanied by crossing out the lesser included 
offenses on the chart prepared by the defense, somehow corrects the 
misstatement. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
The entire defense of Ms. Longshaw was based on her state of 
mind. There was never any question that she had shot Mr. Stewart. 
There were 4 0 people in the room at the time of the incident. Her 
defense, instead, was always based on whether her state of mind 
required a conviction of a lower offense level, primarily that of 
Manslaughter. To this end, the defense carefully established a 
string of factors which affected Ms. Longshaw's ability to function 
and to appreciate her acts on this day in question. These included 
her grief, her mental condition, and also the Soma and Valium she 
had ingested that morning. Each of these, and the combined effect 
of these factors were proper considerations for the jury when 
looking at the state of mind requirements for conviction. It is 
the intent of the law that voluntary intoxication has an impact on 
an individual's state of mind for the purpose of first degree 
murder.1 It can for this crime be a defense. It is however, not 
a defense to the crimes of manslaughter and negligent homicide. 
Id. 
The difficultly with the argument of the prosecutor in this 
case is that it turns the statute on its head and uses somewhat 
confusing language to further mislead and confuse the Jury. The 
Jury should have properly considered all of the factors including 
voluntary intoxication to determine if the Ms. Longshaw's conduct 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306. 
2 
was "reckless" as opposed to with "grave indifference" in the 
analysis of a lessor included offense to murder. It is important 
in looking at what occurred to do so in careful context. 
Mr. Mooney fails on his diagram to mention 
what voluntary intoxication also does with 
regard to criminally negligent types of 
homicide. Basically it does away with 
negligent homicide all together. Even when 
you read the instruction on that - -
(R. 1651) 
This is the part that the State admits to be in error. And it 
is at this point that the defense objected. Id. The Judge in 
response to the objection instructs the Jury to follow the 
instructions. 
It is here that the State insists that counsel corrected his 
misstatement. But this is not the case. He doesn't tell the Jury, 
"I'm sorry", or "I was wrong", he tells them instead "Let's clear 
that up". Id. Then he reads the instruction, stopping in the part 
of the instruction that mentions the word recklessness, and states 
"manslaughter here is recklessness" referring to the chart. Then 
to underscore rather than correct the misstatement, he goes on: 
Again, ladies and gentlemen, I have correctly 
stated the law to you. And negligent homicide 
for voluntary intoxication doesn't apply. And 
the first element of manslaughter, her 
recklessness doesn't apply. 
(R. 1652) And as he speaks, he crosses out manslaughter and 
negligent homicide on the chart before the Jury. 
3 
The clear impression the Jury was left with was that if there 
is voluntary intoxication then you may not find manslaughter based 
on recklessness, leaving the Jury instead with murder even though 
they may have felt recklessness was present, because and only 
because the intoxication may have played a role. 
This argument was of grave prejudice to Ms. Longshaw. It came 
in the rebuttal portion of the argument. There was no opportunity 
for correction of the misstatement in subsequent argument by 
defense counsel; the Jury instead is left to try to figure it out 
on their own. The instruction of the Judge also does not help, it 
only tells the jury to look at the instructions, but the prosecutor 
had already given them an incorrect interpretation of the 
instruction. He is a lawyer, he is representing the State - surely 
the Jury is safe in thinking they can believe him, and if he says 
that the presence of intoxication does away with the lesser 
included charges then why should they think otherwise? 
The State argues as well, that because the statement went to 
the recklessness prong, that the Jury could still find manslaughter 
based upon the other prongs of the statute..2 But this argument 
begs the question. Ms. Longshaw argued the issue of recklessness 
to the Jury, had a chart on the state of mind to help them 
understand the difference between the state of mind required for 
murder and the reckless state of mind found in manslaughter, and 
2Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) (b)-(c) . 
4 
was entitled to have the Jury evaluate this defense clear from 
improper argument that distorts the law. 
The State relies on the case of State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929 
(Utah App 1991) to support its position. In Haston, the prosecutor 
made a misstatement to the jury, i.e. that intoxication could not 
be considered as a defense to a charge of murder based on depraved 
indifference. Supra at 933. After objection, 
"the trial judge failed to expressly rule on 
whether the prosecutor misstated the law, the 
judge called the attention of the jury to the 
written instructions which addressed the 
burden of persuasion for an affirmative 
defense. The court's response to defense 
counsel's objection did not directly 
contradict the prosecutor or correct his 
misstatement, as may have been appropriate." 
Supra at 933. The Court went on to point out that the Judge's 
statement had put the focus back on the instructions rather than 
the argument of counsel, and that even such a weak response, when 
coupled with the overwhelming evidence, was sufficient to negate 
prejudice. In Haston, the prosecution had argued that the 
defendant was not intoxicated, and the evidence did not support 
intoxication, therefore, the defense based on intoxication was not 
applicable, and it didn't matter that the jury may have been 
confused about its impact. 
In the instant matter, the prosecution never disputed that Ms. 
Longshaw was intoxicated; they are the ones that pursued in detail 
her history of drug use (R. 1166-1167, 1169-1170, 1173-1174); they 
5 
then argued that the state of intoxication did away with the other 
offenses, and after the instruction of the Judge, which did not 
correct the prosecutor's statement, the prosecutor continued to 
insist that he was correct. Any implication that the Jury can 
figure out the correct law from the instructions is turned on its 
head when the prosecutor makes misstatements, then after the Judge 
fails to correct him, but merely points the Jury back to the 
instructions, he continues to insist that he is correct. 
The prosecution also argues that voluntary intoxication was 
not a factor in the case because it was not supported by the 
evidence, but this fails to recognize that this was not the 
argument that the prosecution made at the time of trial. The 
prosecution never disputed that Ms. Longshaw was intoxicated but 
they did make the argument for the incorrect principle that 
manslaughter was not an available option. (R. 1651-1652). For the 
State not to dispute at trial that she was intoxicated, and then 
later on appeal argue that the prosecution's misstatements about 
the effect of intoxication on the Jury's ability to decide the case 
don't rise to the level of prejudice because the evidence does not 
support intoxication is a reversal of position that ought not be 
allowed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons here and in appellant's original brief, this 
matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
6 
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